The Troop Surge, Revisited

Joshua Holland of AlterNet has posted an article titled, "The Mythology Surrounding Petraeus' Surge in Iraq Will Keep Us Trapped in Afghanistan". The article makes some valid points, but its analysis of the troop surge is somewhat lacking. Holland argues,

The surge didn’t work. The additional troops were deployed by May 2007. What followed was a bloodbath --June and July were the most violent summer months of any year of the occupation. August was one of the bloodiest months, period. Then, that month, the powerful Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr ordered his Mehdi Army to stand down. The number of Iraqi civilian deaths fell by about 50 percent the next month and decreased again in October and November. The militia was estimated to be 100,000 strong and was arguably the most powerful ground force in Iraq after the U.S. military.

Holland is certainly right to contextualize the troop surge by juxtaposing it with al-Sadr's leadership of the Mahdi Army.  But his assessment of the course of events is not entirely accurate. 

First, let's look at a timeline of events.  The troop surge began in February 2007, with about 3500 troops arriving each month until the surge was completed in May.  From February to November, coalition forces undertook a massive military effort to impose government control over Baghdad, which was largely controlled by sectarian militias.  Al-Sadr went into hiding during February and March, but re-emerged in April to urge his troops-- and Shi'a everywhere-- to fight the foreign invaders.  At the end of August, a clash between Sadrists and the US-allied Badr Organization led al-Sadr to call for a cease fire.  In March-May 2008, coalition forces laid siege to Sadr city, resulting in al-Sadr's de facto surrender of the city to Iraqi government forces.

Now let's look at some casualty figures.  Here are the coalition casualties for 2007, according to iCasualties:

Jan: 86, Feb: 85, Mar: 82, Apr: 117, May: 131, June: 108, July: 89, August: 88, Spetember: 70, November: 40

Clearly April and May were the bloodiest months for coalition forces.  These months coincided with al-Sadr's return and the height of the 2007 battle for Baghdad.  A steady decrease in coalition casualties followed.

The civilian casualty figures are even more telling.  Here are the figures put out by Iraq Body Count (IBC):

Clearly, the number of civilian casualties in June was much lower than any of the preceding twelve months.  Violence rose again in July, but then dropped off again in August.  To characterize these months as a "bloodbath" is to fail to put them into the context of the 12 months that preceded them. The previous summer was much bloodier.  Certainly the most dramatic drop in violence came as a result of al-Sadr's cease fire at the end of August, but the situation had already somewhat improved, and in fact al-Sadr's decision was arguably a result of the coalition's efforts.

Notice also what happened after May 2008, when Sadr City surrendered.  Civilian casualties dropped off significantly, and continued to gradually stabilize thereafter.  At the very least I think we have to acknowledge this success, which almost certainly would not have been possible without the additional troops provided by the surge.

Let's hope that the peace the surge helped achieve can survive the country's present political stalemate and the withdrawal of the last of our combat troops next month.