Why the Consequence Argument Begs the Question

A while back on this blog I discussed the issue of libertarian free will and determinism with Mormon philosopher Blake Ostler. Not surprisingly, Blake defaulted to his favorite argument for libertarian free-will, which philosophers call the "Consequence Argument":

1. If determinism is true, then all our actions and thoughts are consequences of events and laws of nature in the remote past before we were born.
2. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the remote past before we were born, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature.
3. If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B.

Therefore

4. If determinism is true, then we have no control over our own actions and thoughts.

Therefore, assuming that responsibility requires control,

5. If determinism is true, then we are not responsible for anything we do or think.

Therefore, assuming that freedom entails responsibility,

6. If determinism is true, then we are not free, which is to say that every form of compatibilism is false.

I have said before that every argument for libertarian free-will smuggles special, counter-intuitive libertarian conclusions into the premises, and the Consequence Argument is no exception. The crucial question-begging here comes in the third premise. A fairly simple counter-example should serve to illustrate how this premise assumes a special, counter-intuitive definition of "control". Let's look at the premise again:

If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B.

Let's say that "A" refers to the events and natural laws of the distant past, "B" refers to the current core temperature in a nuclear reactor, and "we" refers to a highly sophisticated computer program designed to monitor reactor pressure and temperature and to make adjustments to keep them at safe levels. If the premise were true, then it would be nonsensical to say that our computer program "controls" the reactor temperature.

Yet that obviously is not a nonsensical thing to say. It is in fact a perfectly natural thing to say. Our computer program satisfies all our most intuitive criteria for "control": it monitors and manipulates a system so that the system remains within certain desirable parameters. The fact that laws and events of the distant past are sufficient causes of the current core temperature simply does not negate the fact that the computer exercises control-- except, of course, in a universe where the only acceptable definition of the word control is the counter-intuitive one invented by libertarians.